08-security.md
md4 kBIn assignment_1_solution.zip
7. Security considerations
Organized by layer, using the course vocabulary: authentication, authorization, least privilege, secure communication, scanning. Each line points to where it is done in this repo.
Application
| Measure | Where |
|---|---|
| Passwords stored as salted bcrypt hashes, never in clear | backend/src/routes/auth.js |
| Authentication with short-lived JWT bearer tokens (2 h) | backend/src/auth.js |
Authorization: only the organizer can delete an event (403) |
backend/src/routes/events.js |
| Same error for "unknown email" and "wrong password" (no user enumeration) | auth.js route |
| Rate limiting on login/register (brute force) | express-rate-limit |
| Parameterized SQL everywhere (no SQL injection) | $1, $2… placeholders |
| Input validation, body size limit (100 kB) | routes, express.json({ limit }) |
Security headers (helmet, nginx X-Frame-Options, nosniff) |
index.js, nginx.conf |
| Generic 500 errors, no stack traces leaked | error handler in index.js |
App refuses to start without a strong JWT_SECRET |
auth.js |
Containers and images
| Measure | Where |
|---|---|
Containers run as non-root (node, nginx uid 101) |
both Dockerfiles |
| Multi-stage builds: no compilers, sources or npm in runtime images | both Dockerfiles |
.dockerignore keeps .env and .git out of images |
*/.dockerignore |
| Secrets come from the environment at runtime, never baked in | compose ${VAR:?} |
| Only the frontend publishes a port; API and DB are internal | compose files |
| Vulnerability scan before publishing; base OS patched at build time | scripts/scan.sh, CI, apk upgrade |
Pinned base image versions (node:22-alpine, postgres:18-alpine, nginx-unprivileged:1.30-alpine) |
Dockerfiles |
| Memory limits, log rotation | docker-compose.deploy.yml |
Registries
| Measure | Where |
|---|---|
| All repositories private | each registry's settings |
| Tokens, not passwords, with expiry dates | 03-registries.md |
| Least privilege: write token on the laptop, read-only token / deploy token on servers | 03, 04, 06 |
--password-stdin (no token in shell history) |
all login commands |
docker logout on shared machines; know that ~/.docker/config.json is only base64 |
03-registries.md |
| Rotate and revoke tokens after the course (and after recording a video!) | — |
AWS
| Measure | Where |
|---|---|
| Root user: MFA, no access keys, not used day-to-day | 05-aws-foundations.md |
| Admin work through an IAM identity in a group, with MFA | 05 |
| Security group: SSH from My IP only; only HTTP open to the world | 06 |
SSH key auth only (Ubuntu AMIs disable password login); the .pem never leaves your laptop |
06 |
| IMDSv2 required on the instance | 06 |
| Roles instead of static credentials: EC2 pulls from ECR with an instance role and a custom least-privilege policy | 09-bonus.md |
| Zero-spend budget; cleanup of all billable resources | 05, 06 |
Known limitations (be honest about them)
- No HTTPS. Traffic to
http://<EC2_PUBLIC_IP>is plain text, including passwords and tokens. In production you'd put a domain plus TLS in front: an Application Load Balancer with an ACM certificate, CloudFront, or Caddy/ Let's Encrypt on the instance. - The JWT is stored in
localStorage, so any XSS on the page could read it. AnHttpOnlycookie is the stronger alternative. - Secrets live in a
.envfile on the server. Next step: AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store or Secrets Manager, read at startup through the instance role. - SSH on port 22 is still open (to one IP). SSM Session Manager removes the need for port 22 and key files entirely.